

**MERCER COUNTY BAR ASSOCIATION
XTREME CLE**

COURSE TITLE: Family Law – Alimony Update
2.0 NJ CLE Credits

LOCATION: The Conference Center at MCCC

DATE: Wednesday, October 29, 2014

TIME: 6:15 pm – 8:00 pm

SPEAKERS: Jennifer Zoschak, Esq. of Oswald & Zoschak, PC;
Hon. Peter Warshaw, J.S.C., Grace Dennigan , Esq.,
of Dennigan Cahill, PC and Derek Freed, Esq., of
Ulrichsen Rosen & Freed.

6:15 – 6:25 **Introductions/Review Written Material**

6:25 - 6:45 **Highlight changes to Alimony Statute:**
 “Permanent” v. “Open duration”
 Retirement
 Changed circumstances
 Cohabitation
 Retroactivity

6:45 – 7:45 **Hypotheticals**

7:45 – 8:00 **Q & A**

Mercer County Bar Association

Xtreme 2014 CLE Seminar Evaluation

Family Law – Alimony Update

Wednesday, October 29, 2014

We would greatly appreciate it if you would take a few minutes to complete this questionnaire. These forms are necessary in order to obtain CLE credits. Your feedback will also help with other upcoming events.

How did you first become aware of this seminar? MCBA Website MCBA Newsletter
Received a registration flyer through the Mail Email Firm Other: _____

Rate the following aspects of the seminar. Check one box for each aspect:

	<u>Failed to meet Expectations</u>	<u>Needs Improvement</u>	<u>Met Expectations</u>	<u>Exceeded Expectations</u>	<u>Excellent!</u>
<u>Overall Quality</u>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
<u>Written Materials</u>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
<u>Instructor(s)</u>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
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Rate the content of this seminar: too basic too advanced perfect

Would you recommend this seminar to others? : Yes No Yes, with these changes : _____

What did you like most about the seminar? : _____

What part of this seminar could use improvement? _____

Please give us your suggestions for future seminars: _____

Thank you. Please return this form to the MCBA representative after the seminar.

As a partner of Dennigan Cahill, P.C., Grace A. Dennigan has been practicing law for 27 years. She has specialized in family law work since the early 90's, following her civil trial experience at the New Jersey Attorney General's office. She also teaches Family Law for Paralegals at Mercer County Community College on an adjunct basis and has taught a number of ICLE courses. She is the past Chair of the District VII Ethics Committee.

Honorable Peter E. Warshaw

Honorable Peter E. Warshaw, Jr was appointed to the Superior Court in August 2012. He has been assigned to the Family Part for his entire tenure. For two years he handled the FM and FV dockets and he is currently assigned to Children in Court.

From 1986 to 2012 Judge Warshaw worked for the Monmouth County Prosecutor's Office. He held many different positions including Director of the Major Crimes Unit (1995 – 2005) and First Assistant Prosecutor (2006 - 2010) before being appointed Monmouth County Prosecutor in 2011. In 1997, Judge Warshaw was designated a Certified Criminal Trial Attorney.

Judge Warshaw is a graduate of the University of Delaware and the Widener Law School.

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EMPLOYMENT

Ulrichsen Rosen & Freed LLC

Pennington, NJ

Managing Member, June 2006 to Present

Engage in full-service family law practice and manage firm administration.

Fox Rothschild LLP

Princeton, NJ

Associate (Family Law), September 2000 to June 2006

PRESENTATIONS, ACTIVITIES, AND PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATIONS

- Member, Family Law Executive Committee, 2009-10, 2011 – present
- Chairperson, College Contribution Sub-Committee for the Family Law Executive Committee
- Member, Alternate Dispute Resolution Sub-Committee for the Family Law Executive Committee, 2012 – present
- Associate Managing Editor, New Jersey Family Lawyer
- Presenter, New Jersey Association for Justice, “Joint Custody – A Fiction,” 2012
- Presenter, New Jersey State Bar Association, “Short Term Marriages - Issues of Alimony and Equitable Distribution,” 2010
- Presenter, New Jersey Institute for Continuing Legal Education (NJ ICLE), “Until Debt Do Us Part,” 2010
- Presenter, NJ ICLE, “Introduction to Family Law for New Lawyers,” 2007, 2008, and 2009
- Panelist, Matrimonial Early Settlement Panel (Mercer County), 2004 to present
- Panelist, Matrimonial Early Settlement Panel (Somerset County), 2010 to present
- Member, New Jersey State Bar Association and Mercer County Bar Association

BAR ADMISSIONS

- New Jersey, 2000; Pennsylvania, 2000 (voluntarily inactive)
- United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, 2000

EDUCATION

Rutgers School of Law

Camden, NJ

J.D. with Honors, 2000

- Dean’s Scholar, Spring 1999 & Fall 1999 (awarded to students achieving G.P.A. above 4.0)
- Dean’s List, Spring 2000

The College of William & Mary

Williamsburg, VA

B.A. (History), 1997

Hypotheticals for Mercer County Bar Association

Retirement

In 2004, Eddy Cue and his wife Katie were divorced. Eddy agreed to pay permanent alimony to Katie. At the time of the Marital Settlement Agreement (“MSA”), Eddy was earning \$200,000 gross per annum and Katie was earning \$25,000. Eddy was 49 at the time of the MSA while Katie was 48.

Eddy and Katie’s MSA stated that Eddy intended to retire from the field of software development at the age of 60. Katie outlined that she did not agree with the proposed age of retirement and reserved her right to contest Eddy’s retirement should he make an application.

How does the new alimony law impact Eddy’s application? Katie’s opposition?

When should Eddy file his application? What should he include with his motion?

If Eddy files an application, does Katie have an obligation to provide financial disclosure in the form of a CIS in response?

Would Eddy’s ability to file a motion to modify his obligation be different if the MSA did not state his intention to retire at age 60 and instead included a basic Lepis provision?

If the parties were divorcing today, would it be best to include language stating a prospective desire to retire? Would it be best to leave the language vague?

Cohabitation

Jonathan Ive and his wife, Heather, divorced in 2010. Jonathan agreed to pay Heather \$30,000 per year of limited duration alimony for a period of 12 years. Heather agreed that with the receipt of this \$30,000 per year of alimony, she could meet the marital lifestyle. Jonathan's income at the time of the divorce was \$150,000 gross per year, while Heather's income was \$65,000.

Jonathan has seen Heather at various restaurants with his former friend, Eric Schmidt. He has also seen Heather posting various pictures from her new Android phone suggesting that she is spending a great deal of time at Eric's residence in Hoboken, New Jersey.

Jonathan meets with you and provides the following information:

- (1) Eric is very wealthy;
- (2) Heather is residing at Eric's residence every weekend, but not during the workweek.
- (3) Heather has updated her online status to reflect that she is in a relationship.
- (4) Eric does not share any bank accounts or other obligations with Heather.
- (5) Eric is funding their relationship, paying all expenses when he sees Heather.

Jonathan wants your advice on whether to file a motion to terminate or suspend his alimony based on Heather's alleged cohabitation. What do you advise? What do you ask for? Would your opinion change if Eric's income was equal to Heather's income and the parties were sharing the expenses associated with their relationship?

If Heather is your client, what do you advise her when she receives the motion?

ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE SUBSTITUTE FOR
ASSEMBLY, Nos. 845, 971, and 1649
STATE OF NEW JERSEY

Sponsored by Assemblyman MAINOR, Assemblywoman LAMPITT, Assemblymen KEAN, SINGLETON, GIBLIN, and WIMBERLY, Assemblywoman JIMENEZ, and Assemblyman COUGHLIN

AN ACT concerning alimony and amending N.J.S.2A:34-23.

BE IT ENACTED by the Senate and General Assembly of the State of New Jersey:

1. N.J.S.2A:34-23 is amended to read as follows:

2A:34-23. Alimony, maintenance.

Pending any matrimonial action or action for dissolution of a civil union brought in this State or elsewhere, or after judgment of divorce or dissolution or maintenance, whether obtained in this State or elsewhere, the court may make such order as to the alimony or maintenance of the parties, and also as to the care, custody, education and maintenance of the children, or any of them, as the circumstances of the parties and the nature of the case shall render fit, reasonable and just, and require reasonable security for the due observance of such orders, including, but not limited to, the creation of trusts or other security devices, to assure payment of reasonably foreseeable medical and educational expenses. Upon neglect or refusal to give such reasonable security, as shall be required, or upon default in complying with any such order, the court may award and issue process for the immediate sequestration of the personal estate, and the rents and profits of the real estate of the party so charged, and appoint a receiver thereof, and cause such personal estate and the rents and profits of such real estate, or so much thereof as shall be necessary, to be applied toward such alimony and maintenance as to the said court shall from time to time seem reasonable and just; or the performance of the said orders may be enforced by other ways according to the practice of the court. Orders so made may be revised and altered by the court from time to time as circumstances may require.

EXPLANATION – Matter enclosed in bold-faced brackets [thus] in the above bill is not enacted and is intended to be omitted in the law.

Matter underlined thus is new matter.

The court may order one party to pay a retainer on behalf of the other for expert and legal services when the respective financial circumstances of the parties make the award reasonable and just. In considering an application, the court shall review the financial capacity of each party to conduct the litigation and the criteria for award of counsel fees that are then pertinent as set forth by court rule. Whenever any other application is made to a court which includes an application for pendente lite or final award of counsel fees, the court shall determine the appropriate award for counsel fees, if any, at the same time that a decision is rendered on the other issue then before the court and shall consider the factors set forth in the court rule on counsel fees, the financial circumstances of the parties, and the good or bad faith of either party. The court may not order a retainer or counsel fee of a party convicted of an attempt or conspiracy to murder the other party to be paid by the party who was the intended victim of the attempt or conspiracy.

a. In determining the amount to be paid by a parent for support of the child and the period during which the duty of support is owed, the court in those cases not governed by court rule shall consider, but not be limited to, the following factors:

- (1) Needs of the child;
- (2) Standard of living and economic circumstances of each parent;
- (3) All sources of income and assets of each parent;
- (4) Earning ability of each parent, including educational background, training, employment skills, work experience, custodial responsibility for children including the cost of providing child care and the length of time and cost of each parent to obtain training or experience for appropriate employment;
- (5) Need and capacity of the child for education, including higher education;
- (6) Age and health of the child and each parent;
- (7) Income, assets and earning ability of the child;
- (8) Responsibility of the parents for the court-ordered support of others;
- (9) Reasonable debts and liabilities of each child and parent; and
- (10) Any other factors the court may deem relevant.

The obligation to pay support for a child who has not been emancipated by the court shall not terminate solely on the basis of the child's age if the child suffers from a severe mental or physical incapacity that causes the child to be financially dependent on a parent. The obligation to pay support for that child shall continue until the court finds that the child is relieved of the incapacity or is no longer financially dependent on the parent. However, in assessing the financial obligation of the parent, the court shall consider, in addition to the factors enumerated in this section, the child's eligibility for public benefits and services for people with

disabilities and may make such orders, including an order involving the creation of a trust, as are necessary to promote the well-being of the child.

As used in this section "severe mental or physical incapacity" shall not include a child's abuse of, or addiction to, alcohol or controlled substances.

b. In all actions brought for divorce, dissolution of a civil union, divorce from bed and board, legal separation from a partner in a civil union couple or nullity the court may award one or more of the following types of alimony: ~~[permanent]~~ open durational alimony; rehabilitative alimony; limited duration alimony or reimbursement alimony to either party. In so doing the court shall consider, but not be limited to, the following factors:

- (1) The actual need and ability of the parties to pay;
- (2) The duration of the marriage or civil union;
- (3) The age, physical and emotional health of the parties;
- (4) The standard of living established in the marriage or civil union and the likelihood that each party can maintain a reasonably comparable standard of living, with neither party having a greater entitlement to that standard of living than the other;
- (5) The earning capacities, educational levels, vocational skills, and employability of the parties;
- (6) The length of absence from the job market of the party seeking maintenance;
- (7) The parental responsibilities for the children;
- (8) The time and expense necessary to acquire sufficient education or training to enable the party seeking maintenance to find appropriate employment, the availability of the training and employment, and the opportunity for future acquisitions of capital assets and income;
- (9) The history of the financial or non-financial contributions to the marriage or civil union by each party including contributions to the care and education of the children and interruption of personal careers or educational opportunities;
- (10) The equitable distribution of property ordered and any payouts on equitable distribution, directly or indirectly, out of current income, to the extent this consideration is reasonable, just and fair;
- (11) The income available to either party through investment of any assets held by that party;
- (12) The tax treatment and consequences to both parties of any alimony award, including the designation of all or a portion of the payment as a non-taxable payment;
- (13) The nature, amount, and length of pendente lite support paid, if any; and
- ~~[(13)]~~ (14) Any other factors which the court may deem relevant.

In each case where the court is asked to make an award of alimony, the court shall consider and assess evidence with respect to all relevant statutory factors. If the court determines that certain factors are more or less relevant than others, the court shall make specific written findings of fact and conclusions of law on the reasons why the court reached that conclusion. No factor shall be elevated in importance over any other factor unless the court finds otherwise, in which case the court shall make specific written findings of fact and conclusions of law in that regard.

When a share of a retirement benefit is treated as an asset for purposes of equitable distribution, the court shall not consider income generated thereafter by that share for purposes of determining alimony.

c. In any case in which there is a request for an award of [permanent] alimony, the court shall consider and make specific findings on the evidence about all of the statutory factors set forth in subsection b. of this section [above factors. If the court determines that an award of permanent alimony is not warranted, the court shall make specific findings on the evidence setting out the reasons therefor. The court shall then consider whether alimony is appropriate for any or all of the following: (1) limited duration; (2) rehabilitative; (3) reimbursement. In so doing, the court shall consider and make specific findings on the evidence about factors set forth above. The court shall not award limited duration alimony as a substitute for permanent alimony in those cases where permanent alimony would otherwise be awarded].

For any marriage or civil union less than 20 years in duration, the total duration of alimony shall not, except in exceptional circumstances, exceed the length of the marriage or civil union. Determination of the length and amount of alimony shall be made by the court pursuant to consideration of all of the statutory factors set forth in subsection b. of this section. In addition to those factors, the court shall also consider the practical impact of the parties' need for separate residences and the attendant increase in living expenses on the ability of both parties to maintain a standard of living reasonably comparable to the standard of living established in the marriage or civil union, to which both parties are entitled, with neither party having a greater entitlement thereto.

Exceptional circumstances which may require an adjustment to the duration of alimony include:

(1) The ages of the parties at the time of the marriage or civil union and at the time of the alimony award;

(2) The degree and duration of the dependency of one party on the other party during the marriage or civil union;

(3) Whether a spouse or partner has a chronic illness or unusual health circumstance;

(4) Whether a spouse or partner has given up a career or a career opportunity or otherwise supported the career of the other spouse or partner;

(5) Whether a spouse or partner has received a disproportionate share of the marital estate;

(6) The impact of the marriage or civil union on either party's ability to become self-supporting, including but not limited to either party's responsibility as primary caretaker of a child;

(7) Tax considerations of either party;

(8) Any other factors or circumstances that the court deems equitable, relevant and material.

An award of alimony for a limited duration may be modified based either upon changed circumstances, or upon the nonoccurrence of circumstances that the court found would occur at the time of the award. The court may modify the amount of such an award, but shall not modify the length of the term except in unusual circumstances.

In determining the length of the term, the court shall consider the length of time it would reasonably take for the recipient to improve his or her earning capacity to a level where limited duration alimony is no longer appropriate.

d. Rehabilitative alimony shall be awarded based upon a plan in which the payee shows the scope of rehabilitation, the steps to be taken, and the time frame, including a period of employment during which rehabilitation will occur. An award of rehabilitative alimony may be modified based either upon changed circumstances, or upon the nonoccurrence of circumstances that the court found would occur at the time of the rehabilitative award.

This section is not intended to preclude a court from modifying [permanent] alimony awards based upon the law.

e. Reimbursement alimony may be awarded under circumstances in which one party supported the other through an advanced education, anticipating participation in the fruits of the earning capacity generated by that education. An award of reimbursement alimony shall not be modified for any reason.

f. Except as provided in subsection i., nothing in this section shall be construed to limit the court's authority to award [permanent] open durational alimony, limited duration alimony, rehabilitative alimony or reimbursement alimony, separately or in any combination, as warranted by the circumstances of the parties and the nature of the case.

g. In all actions for divorce or dissolution other than those where judgment is granted solely on the ground of separation the court may consider also the proofs made in establishing such ground in determining an amount of alimony or maintenance that is fit, reasonable and just. In all actions for divorce, dissolution of civil union, divorce from bed and board, or legal separation from a

partner in a civil union couple where judgment is granted on the ground of institutionalization for mental illness the court may consider the possible burden upon the taxpayers of the State as well as the ability of the party to pay in determining an amount of maintenance to be awarded.

h. Except as provided in this subsection, in all actions where a judgment of divorce, dissolution of civil union, divorce from bed and board or legal separation from a partner in a civil union couple is entered the court may make such award or awards to the parties, in addition to alimony and maintenance, to effectuate an equitable distribution of the property, both real and personal, which was legally and beneficially acquired by them or either of them during the marriage or civil union. However, all such property, real, personal or otherwise, legally or beneficially acquired during the marriage or civil union by either party by way of gift, devise, or intestate succession shall not be subject to equitable distribution, except that interspousal gifts or gifts between partners in a civil union couple shall be subject to equitable distribution. The court may not make an award concerning the equitable distribution of property on behalf of a party convicted of an attempt or conspiracy to murder the other party.

i. No person convicted of Murder, N.J.S.2C:11-3; Manslaughter, N.J.S.2C:11-4; Criminal Homicide, N.J.S.2C:11-2; Aggravated Assault, under subsection b. of N.J.S.2C:12-1; or a substantially similar offense under the laws of another jurisdiction, may receive alimony if: (1) the crime results in death or serious bodily injury, as defined in subsection b. of N.J.S.2C:11-1, to a family member of a divorcing party; and (2) the crime was committed after the marriage or civil union. A person convicted of an attempt or conspiracy to commit murder may not receive alimony from the person who was the intended victim of the attempt or conspiracy. Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to limit the authority of the court to deny alimony for other bad acts.

As used in this subsection:

"Family member" means a spouse, child, parent, sibling, aunt, uncle, niece, nephew, first cousin, grandparent, grandchild, father-in-law, mother-in-law, son-in-law, daughter-in-law, stepparent, stepchild, stepbrother, stepsister, half brother, or half sister, whether the individual is related by blood, marriage or civil union, or adoption.

j. Alimony may be modified or terminated upon the prospective or actual retirement of the obligor.

(1) There shall be a rebuttable presumption that alimony shall terminate upon the obligor spouse or partner attaining full retirement age, except that any arrearages that have accrued prior to the termination date shall not be vacated or annulled. The court may

set a different alimony termination date for good cause shown based on specific written findings of fact and conclusions of law.

The rebuttable presumption may be overcome if, upon consideration of the following factors and for good cause shown, the court determines that alimony should continue:

(a) The ages of the parties at the time of the application for retirement;

(b) The ages of the parties at the time of the marriage or civil union and their ages at the time of entry of the alimony award;

(c) The degree and duration of the economic dependency of the recipient upon the payor during the marriage or civil union;

(d) Whether the recipient has foregone or relinquished or otherwise sacrificed claims, rights or property in exchange for a more substantial or longer alimony award;

(e) The duration or amount of alimony already paid;

(f) The health of the parties at the time of the retirement application;

(g) Assets of the parties at the time of the retirement application;

(h) Whether the recipient has reached full retirement age as defined in this section;

(i) Sources of income, both earned and unearned, of the parties;

(j) The ability of the recipient to have saved adequately for retirement; and

(k) Any other factors that the court may deem relevant.

If the court determines, for good cause shown based on specific written findings of fact and conclusions of law, that the presumption has been overcome, then the court shall apply the alimony factors as set forth in subsection b. of this section to the parties' current circumstances in order to determine whether modification or termination of alimony is appropriate. If the obligor intends to retire but has not yet retired, the court shall establish the conditions under which the modification or termination of alimony will be effective.

(2) Where the obligor seeks to retire prior to attaining the full retirement age as defined in this section, the obligor shall have the burden of demonstrating by a preponderance of the evidence that the prospective or actual retirement is reasonable and made in good faith. Both the obligor's application to the court for modification or termination of alimony and the obligee's response to the application shall be accompanied by current Case Information Statements or other relevant documents as required by the Rules of Court, as well as the Case Information Statements or other documents from the date of entry of the original alimony award and from the date of any subsequent modification.

In order to determine whether the obligor has met the burden of demonstrating that the obligor's prospective or actual retirement is

reasonable and made in good faith, the court shall consider the following factors:

(a) The age and health of the parties at the time of the application;

(b) The obligor's field of employment and the generally accepted age of retirement for those in that field;

(c) The age when the obligor becomes eligible for retirement at the obligor's place of employment, including mandatory retirement dates or the dates upon which continued employment would no longer increase retirement benefits;

(d) The obligor's motives in retiring, including any pressures to retire applied by the obligor's employer or incentive plans offered by the obligor's employer;

(e) The reasonable expectations of the parties regarding retirement during the marriage or civil union and at the time of the divorce or dissolution;

(f) The ability of the obligor to maintain support payments following retirement, including whether the obligor will continue to be employed part-time or work reduced hours;

(g) The obligee's level of financial independence and the financial impact of the retirement by the obligor upon the obligee; and

(h) Any other relevant factors affecting the obligor's decision to retire and the parties' respective financial positions.

If the obligor intends to retire but has not yet retired, the court shall establish the conditions under which the modification or termination of alimony will be effective.

(3) When a retirement application is filed in cases in which there is an existing final alimony order or enforceable written agreement established prior to the effective date of this act, the obligor's reaching full retirement age as defined in this section shall be deemed a good faith retirement age. Upon application by the obligor to modify or terminate alimony, both the obligor's application to the court for modification or termination of alimony and the obligee's response to the application shall be accompanied by current Case Information Statements or other relevant documents as required by the Rules of Court, as well as the Case Information Statements or other documents from the date of entry of the original alimony award and from the date of any subsequent modification. In making its determination, the court shall consider the ability of the recipient to have saved adequately for retirement as well as the following factors in order to determine whether the obligor, by a preponderance of the evidence, has demonstrated that modification or termination of alimony is appropriate:

(a) The age and health of the parties at the time of the application;

(b) The obligor's field of employment and the generally accepted age of retirement for those in that field;

(c) The age when the obligor becomes eligible for retirement at the obligor's place of employment, including mandatory retirement dates or the dates upon which continued employment would no longer increase retirement benefits;

(d) The obligor's motives in retiring, including any pressures to retire applied by the obligor's employer or incentive plans offered by the obligor's employer;

(e) The reasonable expectations of the parties regarding retirement during the marriage or civil union and at the time of the divorce or dissolution;

(f) The ability of the obligor to maintain support payments following retirement, including whether the obligor will continue to be employed part-time or work reduced hours;

(g) The obligee's level of financial independence and the financial impact of the retirement by the obligor upon the obligee; and

(h) Any other relevant factors affecting the parties' respective financial positions.

(4) The assets distributed between the parties at the time of the entry of a final order of divorce or dissolution of a civil union shall not be considered by the court for purposes of determining the obligor's ability to pay alimony following retirement.

k. When a non-self-employed party seeks modification of alimony, the court shall consider the following factors:

(1) The reasons for any loss of income;

(2) Under circumstances where there has been a loss of employment, the obligor's documented efforts to obtain replacement employment or to pursue an alternative occupation;

(3) Under circumstances where there has been a loss of employment, whether the obligor is making a good faith effort to find remunerative employment at any level and in any field;

(4) The income of the obligee; the obligee's circumstances; and the obligee's reasonable efforts to obtain employment in view of those circumstances and existing opportunities;

(5) The impact of the parties' health on their ability to obtain employment;

(6) Any severance compensation or award made in connection with any loss of employment;

(7) Any changes in the respective financial circumstances of the parties that have occurred since the date of the order from which modification is sought;

(8) The reasons for any change in either party's financial circumstances since the date of the order from which modification is sought, including, but not limited to, assessment of the extent to which either party's financial circumstances at the time of the

application are attributable to enhanced earnings or financial benefits received from any source since the date of the order;

(9) Whether a temporary remedy should be fashioned to provide adjustment of the support award from which modification is sought, and the terms of any such adjustment, pending continuing employment investigations by the unemployed spouse or partner; and

(10) Any other factor the court deems relevant to fairly and equitably decide the application.

Under circumstances where the changed circumstances arise from the loss of employment, the length of time a party has been involuntarily unemployed or has had an involuntary reduction in income shall not be the only factor considered by the court when an application is filed by a non-self-employed party to reduce because of involuntary loss of employment. The court shall determine the application based upon all of the enumerated factors, however, no application shall be filed until a party has been unemployed, or has not been able to return to or attain employment at prior income levels, or both, for a period of 90 days. The court shall have discretion to make any relief granted retroactive to the date of the loss of employment or reduction of income.

l. When a self-employed party seeks modification of alimony because of an involuntary reduction in income since the date of the order from which modification is sought, then that party's application for relief must include an analysis that sets forth the economic and non-economic benefits the party receives from the business, and which compares these economic and non-economic benefits to those that were in existence at the time of the entry of the order.

m. When assessing a temporary remedy, the court may temporarily suspend support, or reduce support on terms; direct that support be paid in some amount from assets pending further proceedings; direct a periodic review; or enter any other order the court finds appropriate to assure fairness and equity to both parties.

n. Alimony may be suspended or terminated if the payee cohabits with another person. Cohabitation involves a mutually supportive, intimate personal relationship in which a couple has undertaken duties and privileges that are commonly associated with marriage or civil union but does not necessarily maintain a single common household.

When assessing whether cohabitation is occurring, the court shall consider the following:

(1) Intertwined finances such as joint bank accounts and other joint holdings or liabilities;

(2) Sharing or joint responsibility for living expenses;

(3) Recognition of the relationship in the couple's social and family circle;

(4) Living together, the frequency of contact, the duration of the relationship, and other indicia of a mutually supportive intimate personal relationship;

(5) Sharing household chores;

(6) Whether the recipient of alimony has received an enforceable promise of support from another person within the meaning of subsection h. of R.S.25:1-5; and

(7) All other relevant evidence.

In evaluating whether cohabitation is occurring and whether alimony should be suspended or terminated, the court shall also consider the length of the relationship. A court may not find an absence of cohabitation solely on grounds that the couple does not live together on a full-time basis.

As used in this section:

“Full retirement age” shall mean the age at which a person is eligible to receive full retirement for full retirement benefits under section 216 of the federal Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. s.416).

(cf: P.L.2009, c.43, s.1)

2. This act shall take effect immediately and shall not be construed either to modify the duration of alimony ordered or agreed upon or other specifically bargained for contractual provisions that have been incorporated into:

- a. a final judgment of divorce or dissolution;
- b. a final order that has concluded post-judgment litigation; or
- c. or any enforceable written agreement between the parties.

Establishes durational limits and enumerates certain factors concerning modification and termination of alimony; establishes “open durational” alimony.